Harlan Johnson, Sr. v. Delaware County Juvenile Det by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-26-2013 
Harlan Johnson, Sr. v. Delaware County Juvenile Det 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Harlan Johnson, Sr. v. Delaware County Juvenile Det" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1536. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1536 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






HARLAN I. JOHNSON, SR., 




DELAWARE COUNTY JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-11-cv-01166) 
District Judge:  Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 5, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 








 Harlan I. Johnson, Sr., proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting Appellee’s motion 
2 
 
for summary judgment.  For the reasons set forth below, we will vacate and remand for 
further proceedings.  
I. 
 Johnson, a fifty-six-year-old African American male, began work as a detention 
officer at the Delaware County Juvenile Detention Center (“Detention Center”) in June 
1994.  In May 2006, Ronald Berry, the Director of the Detention Center, fired Johnson 
for absence from his assigned duty station.  Johnson filed a grievance with respect to the 
termination.1
 Thereafter, on January 11, 2010, while Johnson was on duty in Unit C-1, he 
conducted a cellular telephone call for approximately five minutes in an area inaccessible 
to inmates containing a stairwell and staff lockers.  Surveillance cameras recorded the 
telephone conversation.  On January 19, 2010, Berry fired Johnson for violating the 2006 
order and the Detention Center’s cellular phone policy.
  The judge presiding over the grievance hearing issued an order setting 
aside Johnson’s termination (the “2006 order”).  The judge also ordered that if in the 
future Johnson “absents himself from his assigned duty station, for any reason, without 
permission, he will be subject to immediate termination.” 
2
                                              
1 Detention Center employees, such as Johnson, work under a collective bargaining 
agreement (“CBA”) with the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees, District Council 88 (“AFSCME”).  Johnson’s grievance was filed in 
accordance with the CBA’s procedure.  AFSCME joined in Johnson’s grievance. 
  Johnson again filed a grievance 
with respect to the termination.  The presiding judge affirmed Berry’s decision to 
 
2 The Detention Center’s Policy and Procedure Manual states that Detention Officers are 
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terminate Johnson.  He found that Johnson absented himself from his assigned duty 
station without permission, in direct violation of the 2006 order.  
 Johnson not appeal his grievance.  In March 2011, Johnson brought this 
employment discrimination action against the Detention Center alleging that he was fired 
and discriminated against based on his race in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), based on his age in violation of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 626, and based on both 
race and age in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq.3  In support of his claims, Johnson argued that Nicholas 
Bellosi, a similarly situated, younger, white employee, was not terminated for leaving his 
work station without supervisory permission.4
 The Detention Center filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District 
Court granted.  The District Court found that although Johnson had established a prima 
facie case of race discrimination, he “failed to meet his burden for raising a genuine issue 
  Johnson also argued that, before he was 
fired, no one had been fired for violating the cellular phone policy. 
                                                                                                                                                  
not permitted to bring cellular phones into the facility. 
3 In April 2010 Johnson filed a charge of discrimination based on race and age with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Commission (“PHRC”).  On March 21, 2011, the EEOC issued  a written 
dismissal and notice of rights to sue under Title VII. 
 
4 In December 2009, a resident assaulted Bellosi.  He was treated by a nurse at the 
Detention Center and instructed to return to work, but left for the day.  When he came 
back the next day, Bellosi had a note from the doctor saying he was medically cleared to 
return to work. 
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of material fact as to pretext in order to survive summary judgment” with respect to either 
claim of racial discrimination or age discrimination.5
II. 
  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  See Giles v. Kearney, 571 
F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment is appropriate only when the “movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “The moving party has the burden 
of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and summary 
judgment is to be entered if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find 
only for the moving party.”  Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citing Anderson  v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).   
III. 
 We analyze Johnson’s discrimination claims according to the familiar burden-
shifting approach of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Under 
this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case.  The burden then 
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
discharge.  If the defendant does so, the presumption of intentional discrimination 
                                              
5 The District Court concluded that Johnson’s claims under the PHRA also failed because 
“the same legal standards and analysis are applicable to claims under both the ADEA and 
the PHRA,” Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 509 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(internal quotation omitted).   
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disappears, but the plaintiff can still prevail by showing that the employer’s proffered 
reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.  Id. at 802-05. 
 This appeal challenges the District Court’s application of the last stage of the 
burden-shifting framework and requires us to determine whether Johnson put forth 
sufficient evidence of pretext.  On summary judgment, Johnson may meet his burden by 
“providing evidence that would allow a fact finder reasonably to (1) disbelieve the 
employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory 
reason was more likely than not the motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s 
action.”  Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 799-800 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted).  “Thus, if [Johnson] has pointed to evidence sufficiently to 
discredit [the Detention Center’s] proffered reasons, to survive summary judgment [he] 
need not also come forward with additional evidence of discrimination beyond his . . . 
prima facie case.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 The Detention Center claims that Johnson’s employment was terminated because 
he violated the 2006 order and the policy prohibiting cell phone use.  Disputing this 
proffered explanation, Johnson  points to evidence that he argues casts doubt on the 
Detention Center’s reasons.  We conclude that Johnson has cast sufficient doubt on the 
Detention Center’s reasons for terminating him to survive summary judgment.  Most 
notably, Johnson presents evidence that cell phone use in the area where he used his cell 




phone was not prohibited.6
                                              
6 The Detention Center argued that Johnson was estopped from claiming that he did not 
absent himself from his work station, in light of the final decision of his grievance.  We 
agree with the District Court that, because it is unclear whether Johnson was an at-will 
employee, there is “reasonable doubt” as to whether the finding that Johnson was absent 
from his work station was “essential” to the decision to deny his grievance.  See 
Chisholm v. Def. Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 50 (3d Cir. 1981).  Accordingly, 
Johnson is not estopped from arguing that he did not absent himself from his work station 
in support of his discrimination claims.   
  Indeed, the District Court states that Johnson raised a genuine 
issue of material fact with respect to this fact.  If a fact finder concluded that Johnson had 
not absented from his work station, it necessarily follows that he was improperly 
terminated pursuant to the 2006 order.  Moreover, as explained by the District Court, if 
Johnson had not absented himself from his work station, yet was still fired, the fact that 
Bellosi, a younger, white employee, was not terminated for leaving his work area without 
supervisory permission “would permit an inference of unlawful discrimination sufficient 
to make a prima facie case.”  Johnson v. Del. Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., No. 11-1166, 2013 
WL 2414076, at * 11 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 2013).  This evidence can also be used to show 
pretext.  See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 370 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[P]rima 
facie case and pretext inquiries often overlap.  As our jurisprudence recognizes, evidence 
supporting the prima facie case is often helpful in the pretext stage, and nothing about the 
McDonnell Douglas [] formula requires us to ration the evidence between one stage or 
the other.”).  While the District Court is correct that “[t]o discredit the employer's 
proffered reason, . . . the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was 
wrong or mistaken,” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765, Johnson has raised questions about the 
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Detention Center’s proffered legitimate reasons for terminating him such that “a 
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.”  Id. (emphasis in 
original) (citations and quotations omitted).   
 In addition to the evidence that Johnson was not absent from his work station 
when he was on his cell phone, and the incident involving Bellosi, Johnson presented 
evidence that, prior to his termination, no one had been fired for violating the cell phone 
policy.  Moreover, Johnson asserts that Berry held a grudge against him and presents 
witness statements to this effect.  It is possible that this alleged grudge traces back to 
2006, when Berry improperly terminated Johnson for absenting from his work station 
once before.  Thus, it is conceivable that, based on this history, a reasonable fact finder 
could conclude that Berry improperly terminated Johnson again in 2010.  From this 
evidence, taken as a whole and viewed in the light most favorable to Johnson, a 
reasonable fact finder could infer that violation of the 2006 order and/or cell phone policy 
were “either [] post hoc fabrication[s] or otherwise did not actually motivate” Johnson’s 
termination.  Id.  Accordingly, there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to 
pretext and the District Court erred in granting the Detention Center’s motion for 
summary judgment. 
 IV.  
 Johnson’s age discrimination claim under the ADEA is also governed by the 
burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell.  See Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 
178, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2005).  The Detention Center’s argument that Johnson fails to show 
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that age was the “but for” cause of his termination pursuant to Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), is misplaced.  In Gross, the issue was whether the 
burden ever shifts to the party defending a mixed-motive discrimination claim under the 
ADEA Id.  Here, Johnson’s claims of discrimination are based on a pretext theory, not 
mixed-motive and, thus, Gross is inapplicable.  As with the Title VII claim, the proper 
analysis is whether Johnson “produced sufficient evidence to establish that [the Detention 
Center’s] proffered rationale for terminating him was a pretext for age-based 
discrimination.” Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009).  As 
established above, there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to pretext and 
summary judgment was improper.7
V. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the Detention Center and remand for further proceedings.  
 
                                              
7 Johnson’s claims under the PHRA are also governed by the burden-shifting framework 
established in McDonnell.  See Fasold, 409 F.3d at 183-84.  Accordingly, summary 
judgment for these claims was improper.  See Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 
228 F.3d 313, 317 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The analysis required for adjudicating [plaintiff’s] 
claim under PHRA is identical to a Title VII inquiry . . . , and we therefore do not need to 
separately address her claim under the PHRA.”). 
